In 2002, Wally Eamer (MBA 1979) took a job that no one really wanted: Trying to broker peace between logging companies, environmentalists, First Nations and the government of British Columbia. These groups had been in conflict over the future of BC’s forests for decades and had grown bitter, and there was little hope of resolution. But within four years, Wally and his fellow negotiators hashed out a tentative way forward, and—a decade later—the agreement was finalized and then celebrated by everyone involved. By the end, the goals had become so universal, negotiators actually switched sides, moving from one stakeholder to another. In Wally’s case, he began the negotiations working for the government, and—by the end—he was working for First Nations.

Bulletin editor and Skydeck host Dan Morrell talked to Wally about his approach to these unique negotiations, why they were so successful in the face of such great odds, and what the experience taught him.

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Dan Morrell: When the average person thinks about negotiation, they usually think of it in binary terms, as something that can be won or lost. But that's not what you were engaged in as a negotiator for the provincial government. Talk to me about the approach that you guys employed.

Wally Eamer: We were trying for what I think technically is called a Pareto optimal outcome, which is better for all the parties, as opposed to if there's 10 things on the table, if I get eight you get two. We're trying to figure out a way that we both get eight. How do we create a system that has wins for all the major actors?

And that ties very directly into what our definition was for a consensus agreement. And consensus in our terms meant that the overall agreement was acceptable although individual parts of that agreement may be difficult for the decision-maker. That's different than saying everybody is 100% on every part of the agreement, which would be wonderful if it could happen, but that's not something that will happen often if ever. Consensus, then, for us meant you could agree to the whole although maybe individual parts were difficult for you.

The incentive for that was that if we achieved this, implementation became highly probable. It meant that if we failed, or if we had a majority report and a minority report, no one had any level of assurance that that outcome would actually be implemented and would go into force on the ground.

The tools we used were what we called interest-based negotiation. So everyone would give my interests are these as opposed to my position is this. That made the negotiating less personalized, which is actually important for people to accept change. It also meant that it was easier to learn and change.

Morrell: What did things look like when they broke down? What did it look like in the room? How could you tell it was coming apart some days?

Eamer: Part of it is how people express themselves physically with their hands. Part of it is how they turn away and they will tend to hunker with those who are with them. Part of it is blame-- I know I'm right, I know I'm trying hard to be reasonable, and you don't agree. That must mean you truly are-- fill in the blanks and none of them are good.

So once you get into that behavior pattern and language pattern where-- I'm so knowledgeable, I'm working so hard, I'm trying so hard to reach out to others, and they still don't agree, therefore they must truly be bad people with dumb ideas. That happens frequently. And that's where some of the faith and that's where some of a rough sense of respect for the other parties that is individually-based and not based on the positions they're taking forward, that becomes key. Because at the end of the day, there is a peace that comes through war and there's a peace that comes through negotiation. And I think I'm mixing metaphors.

But the peace through war is what I would call the bulldozer. This was an attempt at peace through negotiation. And in its own way, somewhat imperfectly-- but so is peace through war imperfect-- it succeeded.

Morrell: Did you find, I should say, that some of the best negotiations would happen away from the table?

Eamer: It's like romance-- 90% of the romance is before the last 10 minutes, or it better be.

Morrell: Socializing seems like it was an important part of the process, right?

Eamer: Well, it was. That's where the personalities were important and where in some ways this problem was a good fit to my personality. What I found powerful is that for me I had to have a model of how each of the different parties to the negotiation saw the world, what their pressures on them were, where their funding was, what their time scale was, what their values were. And then it was always trying to come back to that and find answers that fit within their needs that also fit in the needs of the others.

You don't learn those things at a negotiation table. You learn a bit of it. A lot of that comes through talking over coffee, talking on the phone between negotiation sessions, all what seems like informal stuff. If that doesn't exist, I can't imagine an agreement of this complexity could have been reached.

And that also takes time. And the first stage literally took about three to four years. And although it made some people think that the other guys were completely wrong and all those other things, that also established the basis of long-term relationships starting to be built outside strictly conflict. And we didn't have any marriages out of this or anything. I'm not suggesting that. But that was absolutely necessary.

And in a small way, I modeled that. Because in the seconds after the first and second stages of negotiation or models of negotiation-- then we moved into long-term development-- I moved from one of the major actors to one of the other major actors. And a couple of other people did that as well.

And that was important because we could be true to our own sense of right and wrong, true to the shared values that this process and these answers spoke to, and still represent one of the parties in an honorable way. So there were some common values that went beyond each individual party at the table. And those common values and those common rules and understandings are critically important or it's extraordinarily difficult to get a consensual, not peaceful, complex agreement.

Morrell: You and I talked previously regarding your style. And you said that you had a rule that when you spoke it had to be clear, simple, and true.

Eamer: Needed to be. Whether it was was a separate issue. But needed to be.

Morrell: Do you remember any of those specific things that you had to say?

Eamer: Oh, I'll give you a short one right now. We're looking for answers that are good for everybody. When people talk of balanced decisions, does that mean we're trying to do a mediocre job for everybody? No. You get five I get five? I want something where you get eight and I get eight. So don't give me mediocre is balanced. I won't accept it.

Morrell: Did you feel the pressure of delivering these statements at all? Did you test them, practice them in the mirror, anything like that?

Eamer: You know I never tested them in the mirror because that would mean it was performance art.

Morrell: Right.

Eamer: And, yeah, there's a little bit of that. But it was very important-- for me at least, I can't fake authenticity. Some people can. I can't.

And it had to flow from the moment. If something was troubling me, I would try different ways of exploring it, et cetera, in my own mind before the meetings. But at the meetings, the intent is at those meetings to learn. You have to be open to what the other-- vulnerable is a really important thing, which is where trust also comes in.

You have to be open, almost vulnerable, to understand the other person in a deep way or the other people in a deep way. That means that what you thought you were going to say when you walked in that room is not exactly-- or it may be somewhat-- different from what you actually do say there.

So it needs to flow from the moment. And if it doesn't, it probably won't work. Because that means that you went in there determined not to learn.

Morrell: You obviously have spoken to your fellow negotiators. And your fellow negotiators noted that you operated in a low key fashion. But then when you spoke, people would sit up and listen. And I know that's strategic in some ways. But is that also just simply part of your nature and the way you operate?

Eamer: Oh, hell no-- excuse me, heck no.

Actually, especially when I was younger, I talked a lot and I could easily hog the floor. I find, though, that when I'm serious and when it's important I become quieter and I actually speak more quietly. So I speak less and I tend to speak in a calmer, lower voice. When I'm loud I tell people it's all nonsense and I'm having a good time.

And again, if I'm at that table not in a persuasion mode directly but in a learning mode-- and from that learning then there is a need to present these ideas, from which there will be further learning; so maybe this is not what our final position will be-- then that means I listen more and say less.

And actually, one of the First Nation guys taught me a useful phrase because he was busy arguing with his aunt, I think, or grandmother. And she said, are you listening to argue or listening to listen?

There's a difference. When you're listening to argue, you're looking for the differences and the places you can disagree. When you're listening to listen, you're trying to understand and you're open, you're vulnerable to being changed by that, which means you're not sure what you're going to say next.

And that was important. Those who refused to listen to listen, who refused to learn, who refused to be vulnerable, we were successful fundamentally because in time they become less and less important. The train moved on without them.

Morrell: What do you think you learned about yourself in this process?

Eamer: I'm going to rephrase that question a little bit. What did I learn from this process and what changed as a result? And what it taught me, or reinforced for me, was the importance of clarity, of simplicity; the importance of faith in the best sense, that we will continue on even though we're not sure there's an answer at the end of this-- maybe it all will blow up.

A number of those elemental frontier type virtues are important whenever you're going to build something that has never been built before. It's one thing to know exactly how something can work and to build the tenth franchise, or the hundredth, or the thousandth franchise restaurant under a model. It's quite different to invent something from scratch with competing ideas, competing ideals.

And what I learned is that that's deeply satisfying but that it's collaborative in the best sense of the word, and that the final product, you're not sure which is your part and which is the other guy's part. And that's great, because otherwise it doesn't work.

Morrell: This thing that you helped to build, you just laid out the fact that it's very unique and that it won't necessarily work then everywhere. Why did it work there?

Eamer: It worked here because the key power players all had very significant interests. And I think the key power players for me were local communities which were literally going into Great Depression style economies, environmentalists, forest companies, First Nation governments, and the landowner-- which in Canada is the provincial government, the government landowner. Each of them could see that things could be much better, and each of them was facing poor to catastrophic outcomes if it failed.

That meant that the best alternative to no agreement-- the old famous BATNA-- was front and center for the major actors and it was highly negative. And so it put an impetus for agreement.

And there's elements of this-- for example, some of the ideas around in the processes and outcomes that we put in place around relationships between the provincial government and the First Nation governments, and between First Nation governments and the major forest companies, those have actually been a lesson for other parts of Canada, and to some extent elsewhere in the world. So those lessons should not be copied. But they should be absorbed and then applied to the local situation.

And that has happened. And so in a sense, I think this is a successful model that's being applied elsewhere. It will look different elsewhere, just the same as a forest in the interior of British Columbia or in the tropical areas of Indonesia will look different than the temperate coastal rainforest from between Alaska and Washington state. It may look different, but key principles, they apply.

And it was the development of those key principles that I think is really important and that I'm hopeful-- and actually I see some reality; never as fast as many of us would hope-- that learning is occurring and it is being applied. And people will find things that are a better way of doing it than we ever came up with. And that's wonderful, because that's what the world needs. That's not a failure. That's wonderful.

Skydeck is produced by the External Relations department at Harvard Business School and edited by Craig McDonald. It is available at iTunes or wherever you get your favorite podcasts. For more information or to find archived episodes, visit alumni.hbs.edu/skydeck.

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